Research Article
Strategic Interaction between Operators in the Context of Spectrum Sharing for 5G Networks
| | | Eq. |
| General Model | | | Mean packet system time | | (1) | Mean service rate | | (1) | Subscribers mean arrival rate | | (1) | Operator 1’s number of users | | (1) | Operator 2’s number of users | | (1) | Virtual Operator’s relative priority | | (2) | Quality perceived by the users | | (4) | Users sensitivity to delay | | (4) | Conversion factor | | (4) | Users utility | | (5) | Price charged by operator | | (5) | Operator i’s profits | | (6) |
| Game Model | | | Operator 1’s best response | | (11) | Operator 2’s best response | | (12) | Operator 1’s equilibrium price | | (13) | Operator 2’s equilibrium price | | (14) | Operator 1’s equilibrium number of users | | (16) | Operator 2’s equilibrium number of users | | (16) | Arbitrarily small positive value | | | Boundary cases I-II | | (34) | Boundary cases I-II | | (35) | Boundary cases III-IV | | (36) | Boundary cases II-IV | | (37) |
| The Appendix- Monopoly | | | Monopolistic operator’s profits | | (A.1) | Monopolistic operator’s number of users | | (A.1) | Price charged by monopolistic operator | | (A.1) | Users Utility | | (A.3) | Monopolistic operator’s optimal price | | (A.9) |
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