Analysis of Signal Game for Supply Chain Finance (SCF) of MSEs and Banks Based on Incomplete Information Model

Table 2

Summary of mixed equalization.

Mixed equalization strategy	Strategy of SMEs	(join, join)
	Strategy of Bank	(loan, no loan); When MSE joins supply chain finance, the bank chooses the loan; when MSE does not join the supply chain finance, the bank chooses not to lend.
Equilibrium condition	(1) P(C1 ∣ not join)=, .; (2) Default cost .
Returns	Returns of bank
	Returns of good MSE
	Returns of bad MSE
Description	Under the condition of mixed equilibrium, the income of enterprises “joining” is higher. Both good and bad companies will choose to join supply chain finance. Banks will be willing to believe that the enterprises in supply chain finance are probable of good enterprises and lend to supply chain finance. SMEs. When the company joins, the bank is willing to lend to the enterprises in the supply chain finance because the guarantee of the core enterprise can share the risk of the non-repayable loan of some bad enterprises.