Research Article
Complexity Analysis of a 3-Player Game with Bounded Rationality Participating in Nitrogen Emission Reduction
| Notations | Description |
| x(t) | The government’s policy intensity at period t | z(t) | The public’s supervision intensity at period t | y(t) | The agricultural enterprises’ output at period t | A | The highest price of the product in the market | C | The marginal production cost | | The consumer losses caused by the unit emission of nitrogen | E | Initial unit amount of nitrogen emissions | pe | The price of emission permits | N | The marginal abatement costs | y0 | The initial nitrogen emission permits | | The impact coefficient of policy intensity on emission reduction | | The emission reduction coefficient | | The impact coefficient of supervision intensity on emission reduction | G | The emission reduction subsidy coefficient | | The government’s various tax revenues | | The treatment cost of per unit nitrogen emission | | The government’s marginal supervisory cost | | The base value of the product | M | The initial supervision cost of the public | M | The impact coefficient of policy intensity on supervision cost |
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