Evolutionary Game Dynamics of the Competitive Information Propagation on Social Networks

Table 1

Model notation and definitions.

Notation	Definition
	The strategy set of at time t
	The payoff of for one pairwise interaction with friend j at time t
	The basic payoff of individuals who choose strategy A
	The basic payoff of individuals who choose strategy B
	The bonus attained by an individual who believes one piece of information when their friend chooses the same strategy
	The punishment accrued by an individual who believes either piece of information when their friend chooses to believe the other competing piece of information
	The total payoff of individual at time t
	The friends set of individual
	The number of friends connected to individual i
	The number of friends connected to individual i at time t who adopt strategy A
	The number of friends connected to individual i at time t who adopt strategy B
	The friend of individual i who attains the minimum payoff
	The sensitivity to payoffs of individuals
	The probability that individual believes its friend j at time t
ɛ	The environment noise factors, which reflect the individual uncertainty at the time when strategy updates occur
	The number of times individual i has received the information that is believed by their friend before time t
	The number of times individual i and have adopted different strategies when i receives the information believed by before time t
	The probability that individual will adopt the strategy of friend j at time t + 1